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1963/04/08

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DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY~~SECRET~~

April 8, 1963

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MEMORANDUM FOR: U - The Acting Secretary

FROM: G - U., Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: U-2 Flights, Cuba, -- Contingency Plans.

There is attached a slightly revised draft on the foregoing subject which now has the concurrence of OSD and the JCS except that General Taylor desires to discuss further the problem of timing under Section III. B. 2. -- that is, an attack on a SAM site within the same day the U-2 is shot down. In this connection it is important to note that, while it is militarily possible and in most ways desirable to carry out an attack within the same day if at all possible, it means that our other forces, particularly SAC, would not be at a maximum state of readiness in the event of major Soviet retaliation. As noted in paragraph I. C., a maximum state of military readiness from our present posture requires approximately 72 hours.

I would appreciate any guidance that you may have as to what disposition should now be made of this paper.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Copy to: S/AL - Amb. Thompson.

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U-2 FLIGHTS, CUBA -- CONTINGENCY PLANS

I. FACTS BEARING ON PROBLEM:

- A. While not a certainty, present intelligence resources give a considerable degree of confidence that Washington should, within minutes, have reliable information on the destruction of a U-2 by a SAM. There is also a possibility that correspondingly reliable information would be available with respect to an unsuccessful firing of a SAM on a U-2. However, there remains a possibility that a U-2 could disappear under circumstances in which we had no positive information on the cause of its loss.
- B. Alternative methods of carrying on surveillance are available but the quantity of data that could be obtained with these alternative methods is very much smaller than that obtainable with the U-2; thus, the available alternatives would not meet presently stated requirements.
- C. Before taking action that could result in Soviet retaliation, it would be highly desirable and militarily prudent to bring our forces, particularly SAC, to a high degree of readiness as well as to evacuate dependents from Guantanamo and reinforce that base. Such steps would require approximately 72 hours and could not be initiated without almost immediate public knowledge.
- D. From the present posture, and assuming that the facts can be determined and evaluated within the time frame now considered probable, and weather permitting, it is militarily possible to mount an attack against a single SAM site within the daylight hours of the same day

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2. Initiate military preparations by declaration of appropriate DEFCON in all U. W. commands, evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo, etc.
3. Inform NAC.
4. Presidential messages to Macmillan, Adenauer, de Gaulle and Fanf.
5. All Organ of Consultation, OAS, to obtain reaffirmation necessity of overflights.
6. Inform Secretary General of the United Nations and consider what additional United Nations action should be taken.
7. Transmit message from the President to Khrushchev.
8. Public statement by the President, including a message to the Cuban people.
9. Upon completion of military preparations within about 72 hours resume U-2 flights.
10. If there is a single unsuccessful attack on a U-2, promptly announce publicly, including fact U-2 flights will continue, but do not at this stage attack SAM site.
11. If there is a second attack -- successful or unsuccessful -- promptly take out the SAM site identified or suspected as having carried out the attack.
12. If attacks are resumed, simultaneously take out remaining SAM sites.

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B. No prior public warning or indicators of imminent Soviet action:

1. Unsuccessful attack:

- a. Announce publicly fact of attack.
- b. Take all measures under III. A. above.

2. Successful attack:

- a. Initiate military preparations for attack on SAM site within same day if possible.
- b. Declare appropriate DEFCONs in all United States commands, and initiate evacuation of dependents and reinforcement of Guantanamo.
- c. Transmit Presidential message to Khrushchev for delivery at hour attack on SAM is to be launched. (Message should simultaneously be given to Soviet Ambassador in Washington.)
- d. Inform NAC immediately prior to attack.
- e. Transmit instructions to USUN to inform Secretary General of the United Nations at time attack is initiated and call for immediate Security Council meeting at same time.
- f. Call meeting of Organ of Consultation of the OAS as closely as possible to time attack scheduled.
- g. Transmit Presidential messages to Adenauer, Macmillan, de Gaulle and Fanfani.
- h. Issue public statement by President at hour attack is launched.
- i. Carry out attack on identified or suspected SAM site.

C. Links

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C. Linkage by Soviets of Berlin and Cuba.

If Soviets wholly or partially blockade Berlin in response to United States attack against SAM sites, immediately convene Quadripartite Group to consider implementation or appropriate modification of "Preferred Sequence" courses of action with respect to Berlin.

D. U-2 is missing.

No action should be initiated until there is confirmation that the disappearance is the result of a successful attack. Then proceed in accordance with III. A. or III. B. 2. as appropriate.

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